

ORIG :
 UNIT :
 EXT :
 DATE : 16 MAY 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 16 MAY 57 18 10z

TOP SECRET

ROUTING	
1	OPS
2	IMP
3	JAG
4	MAI
5	ADMIN/SO
6	RI

25X1

25X1

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SA/PC/DCI (1,2,3,4,5,6)

INFO : S/C (7)

RDO

0256 (OUT 64119)

1610Z 16 MAY 57

OUT 64119 16 MAY 57
PRIORITY
 PRECEDENCE
 CITE:

25X1

25X1

0256

1./ AS A RESULT OF OUR MEETING WITH OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AT SAC HQS
 15 MAY TO DISCUSS THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF OUR FUTURE OPERATIONS IN EAST
 RUSSIA, IT WAS THE CONCERTED OPINION THAT COVERAGE OF KAMCHATKA AND BAIKAL
 TARGETS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED THE BASIC FACTOR
 BEHIND THIS REASONING IS THAT APPROACHES TO TARGETS IMPOSED BY LIMITED RANGE
 WILL MAKE RADAR DETECTION IN BOTH AREAS ALMOST CERTAIN. THE PLAN
 EVOLVED, AND ALL WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THIS, IS (1) COVER KAMCHATKA
 TARGETS WITH A PRE AND POST-FLIGHT STAGE MISSION FROM AND (2)
 COVER LAKE BAIKAL TARGETS WITH A MISSION PRE AND POST-FLIGHT STAGING
 IN THE CASE OF THE KAMCHATKA MISSION, THERE ARE SEVERAL DISTINCT
 ADVANTAGES. THESE ARE:

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25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

B. THIS ROUTE WILL ALLOW TARGET ACCESS WEST OF THE SEA THUS GIVING
 THE PILOT AN OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE TARGET WEATHERED CONDITIONS BEFORE
 PENETRATING RUSSIAN TERRITORY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE BECAUSE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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OF THE LOW CONFIDENCE FACTOR THE WEATHER FORECASTERS HAVE IN KAMCHATKA WEATHER.

C. BECAUSE OF THE INTENSE USAF FERRUT ACTIVITY IN THE KAMCHATKA AREA, OUR FLIGHTS IF DETECTED MAY WELL BE TAKEN FOR ROUTINE FERRUT ACTIVITY WHICH NORMALLY DOES NOT CAUSE AN ALL OUT ALERT.

D. EXCELLENT NAVIGATION CHECK POINTS EXIST ALONG THE OVER WATER ROUTE FROM [] TO COVER THE KAMCHATKA TARGETS IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED ABOVE FROM [] WAS CONSIDERED AND ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD ALLOW SUFFICIENT RANGE TO MAKE A WESTERLY PENETRATION FROM THE SEA, THE RADAR SURVEILLANCE PROBLEM DURING CLIMB-OUT AND ENROUTE MAKES THIS PLAN UNDESIRABLE. ALSO ROUTE NAVIGATION OVER WATER FROM [] WOULD BE LIMITED TO DR AND CELESTIAL.

2. IN THE CASE OF LAKE BAIKAL TARGETS, THE DISTANCE FROM [] TO BAIKAL LEAVES NOTHING IN RANGE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POSSIBLE WEAK SPOTS IN EAST RUSSIAN RADAR DEFENSES. HOWEVER, WERE IT POSSIBLE TO INCREASE OUR RANGE [] THE PRESENT ROB SHOWS NO POINT ON THE CASPIAN SHORE WHERE PENETRATION COULD BE MADE UNDETECTED. IN STAGING FROM [] THAT THE ROUTE AND APPROACH TO TARGET WILL BE MADE OVER AN AREA OF LITTLE OR

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25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

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NO KNOWN RADAR AND IT IS CONSIDERED VERY LIKELY THAT PENETRATION TO THE TARGET AREA COULD BE MADE WITHOUT DETECTION. ALTHOUGH THE TERMINAL CONDITIONS AT PESHAWAR ARE NOT AS GOOD AS THOSE [REDACTED] THEY ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS MISSION AND IT IS FELT THAT THE INCONVENIENCE AND DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN LAUNCHING A MISSION FROM PESHAWAR ARE FAR OUTWEIGHED BY THE VAST RADAR DEFENSES TO BE PENETRATED ENROUTE TO THE TARGET

[REDACTED] SHOULD YOU CONCUR THIS PROGRAM PLANNING WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO EFFECT [REDACTED] STAGING. INFO AVAILABLE SAC HQS INDICATES LFLA AND MA2 STARTER UNITS IN PLACE EDLSON. THIS WILL REDUCE STAGING EFFORT TO TRANSPORTING FAK, PERSONNEL AND LIMITED AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO [REDACTED] SAC HAS AGREED TO SUPPORT FULLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE [REDACTED] OPERATION. FEEL ALL-OUT EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN STAGING BASE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECURITY

MATERIAL

DEP PROJ DIR

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